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The title of this panel may be a little misleading if it
gives the impression that citizens should deal with
social issues as individuals, rather than through col-
lective institutions. Human beings, unlike some other
animals, do not hunt alone or in small packs, and do
not just squirrel away stocks of food to shelter future
welfare from bad luck and old age. In history protec-
tion from life risks has always led to the same increas-
ingly complex social interactions that, through mar-
kets or governments, enable mankind to enjoy a better
standard of living.
Human societies establish chains of command, orga-
nize information flows and enforce property rights for
the purpose, not only of organizing production effi-
ciently but also of distributing it across individuals
and over each individual’s lifetime. So while the issues
discussed in this panel are very topical, as there is no
doubt that recent and likely future developments pose
very serious challenges to the role of governments in
social protection, they are also very old. 
Income sharing and the nation
To identify the sources and possible solutions of cur-
rent challenges it may be insightful to recall why and
how governments came to play an important social
protection role.1 Historically, the largest step away
from traditional sharing of income within extended
families or tribes occurred with the industrial revolu-
tion. Organization of production in large firms eased
division of labor and made it possible to exploit
economies of scale, but also severed the blood relation
and personal acquaintance ties that bound village-
sized societies together. A society of city-dwelling
workers required a new social texture, based on disci-
plined execution of simple tasks as well as on self-
interested market participation. And it needed to
organize transfers of resources over time and across
individuals through collective schemes, as well as
through the increasingly sophisticated contracts made
possible by the development of stock markets, banks
and insurance companies.
The same advances in communication and transport
that increased the scale of production and trade also
made it possible to develop cultural traits that would
allow resources to be shared more broadly. Contracts
that entail more than a spot exchange need to rely on
legal enforcement when they extend beyond the range
of personal reputation and trust. The new nations
established in the last few centuries were based on
more or less artificial ethnic ties, but especially on the
development of cultural features common to all social
classes in large geographical areas. This was a new
development, as the cultural basis of previous large-
scale political entities was too shallow to even estab-
lish a common language outside of the elite classes,
and made it possible for industrial production to sup-
port, over the same relatively short span of history,
unprecedentedly fast and broad economic growth.2
The socio-political infrastructure of nations not only
provided a suitable legal framework for large-scale
operation of markets, but also extended the scope of
solidarity beyond each individual’s immediate circle
of family and acquaintances, making it possible to
fund and administer the formal social insurance
schemes needed to replace the family- or village-level
safety nets destroyed by urbanization. As regards
pensions, the mostly public and unfunded pension
schemes of European countries reproduce at the
national level the old-age support that used to be sup-
plied across generations within families or villages.
The pay-as-you-go relationship between contribu-
tions and pensions reduces capital accumulation
below what would be implied if each individual had
1 See e.g. Bertola (2007) on the origins of national social protection
schemes; Foucault (1975) or Seabright (2010) on more general socio-
economic features of industrial societies.
2 Maddison (2007) estimates that world per capita income has grown
by more than 600 percent since 1820, only by 20 percent between
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to provide through savings for old age: but the same
would have been true in villages where adult children
cared for their aging parents instead of accumulating
resources for their own old age. In modern societies
with looser personal ties, public schemes can in fact
be more efficient than financial market contracts if
individuals do not have accurate information about
their future needs and current investment opportuni-
ties, and the government’s ability to enforce manda-
tory participation can prevent individuals from free-
riding on the social assistance that the government is
bound to provide if they do not save enough (or do
not have enough children) to provide for themselves
in old age.
Europe and finance
As recent events have made clear, and as the Panel is
meant to discuss as regards old-age pension schemes
specifically, no solution is perfect. New problems
arise from the solution offered by nations to the
problem of adapting market and social infrastruc-
ture to the transition beyond agriculture and vil-
lages. In order to foster solidarity within their
boundaries, nation-states cultivate not only their cit-
izens’ common cultural roots, but also the fear and
hostility towards strangers that make war politically
acceptable. Changes over time of the environment in
which nations operate are also problematic, as the
socio-economic scale that was suitable for the early
mass-production stages of industrialization need
not remain efficient forever: further fast progress of
communication and transportation technologies,
and the spread of nationalism to less developed
regions of the world, undermined the socio-eco-
nomic foundations of closed and imperialistic
nations.
Over the last few decades, solutions to such new prob-
lems have emerged. On the one hand, in the form of a
European process of supranational economic and
monetary unification that was explicitly motivated by
the desire to prevent further war through economic
and cultural convergence. On the other hand, in the
shape of increasingly sophisticated and broad finan-
cial markets that are potentially capable of engineer-
ing the transfers of resources that once took place in
families and villages, and that national schemes may
find it increasingly difficult to organize in an environ-
ment where trade and factor mobility undermine gov-
ernments’ ability to enforce mandatory contributions
and taxes.
Just like other national solidarity-based programs,
public unfunded pension schemes can be undermined
by trade and factor mobility opportunities that, at
least to some extent, effectively make it possible for
income earners to opt out of supposedly mandatory
taxes and contributions, by producing abroad, and for
poor individuals to seek subsidies in more generous
systems. A more imminent challenge to public pay-as-
you-go pension schemes arises from demographic
trends that, in most developed countries, call a shrink-
ing number of working-age individuals to provide for
ever larger cohorts of retirees. 
Ageing is also a problem for funded pension schemes,
however. In modern economies, private savings
increase the stock of productive capital, rather than a
hoard of accumulated consumption goods. To the
extent that a smaller labor force decreases returns to
investment, it also reduces the viability of funded pen-
sion schemes. From this perspective, it is unsurprising
to see that defined-benefits pensions disappear even
faster in the private sector than in public-sector pen-
sion reforms. Regardless of whether they are funded
or unfunded, private or public, pension schemes can
react to demographic trends in two ways only: by
delaying retirement, and by adapting old-age benefits
to longer survival probabilities. 
Ageing internationally
Life expectancy does not only vary across generations
within the political and cultural boundaries of nation-
states. It varies with socio-economic conditions with-
in generations, and within countries and cities.3 And
its generational dynamics are rather different across
countries, making it at least potentially possible to
seek international solutions to national pension prob-
lems. Just like in early industrial societies old-age sup-
port could not be provided by families, nations where
a shrinking labor force challenges both public and pri-
vate retirement schemes may need to rely on global-
ized economic interactions. 
Figure 1 reveals two interesting and relevant facts.
Between 1999 and 2009, Germany has been getting
older faster than any other country but Japan, and
has accumulated one of the largest current account
surpluses among industrialized countries. This coun-
try-specific observation lines up neatly in the figure
3 For example, life expectancy decreases by roughly one year per
Tube stop along lines than run from Central London to the East
End: see http://eurohealthnet.eu/research/health-inequalities/health-
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with the strong and statistically significant relation-
ship, across all countries with available data, between
cumulated current accounts and changes in old age
dependency ratios over the last ten years. For coun-
tries that need to provide for their ageing citizens, it is
very sensible to consume relatively less, and to invest
their savings in countries where young workers will
remain relatively abundant over the relevant time
horizon.
As usual, there is no perfect solution: international
opportunities come with international pitfalls. The
savings that German society entrusted to its banks
were invested in the liabilities of countries that had
less severe ageing problems and were also growing
fast, such as the United States of 1990s productivity
miracles, and the EU peripheral countries that had
been catching up since their accession in the 1990s.
Past performance, as usual, does not guarantee future
returns. Hopes of reliable repayment waned as the
recent crisis made it doubtful that the United States
could rejoin its past growth path, and made it certain
that Greece will be unable to replicate the 30-percent
real per capita GDP growth it experienced between
2000 and 2007. 
While disappointing international investment returns
may lead some to advocate a return to earlier nation-
centered configurations of socio-economic relation-
ships, more likely developments can be identified ana-
lyzing the problems that emerged during the crisis for
the European Union and financial development solu-
tions to the problems of nation-based systems.
Unification of markets, and then of monies, has been
meant since the 1950 in order to prevent further wars
between European nations. The
process was enlarged in the 1980s
to countries burdened by a histo-
ry of colonial or imperial rule and
fascism, and then to Central and
Eastern European countries that
had experienced Soviet domina-
tion, aiming to foster their cultur-
al and economic convergence by
adoption of acquis communau-
taire good government practices
and of a market-based economic
framework. The acceleration of
financial development was also
meant to address the real problem
of matching, in better ways than
those of families and govern-
ments, the diverse investment and
savings of individuals and countries interacting in
increasingly complex and open economies.
Just like those who invested in innovative financial
products expressed faith in the power of diversifica-
tion, those who bought Greek debts purchased a stake
in that supranational European project. The financial
and economic crisis of 2008–09 showed that diversifi-
cation is powerless in the face of aggregate shocks;
that macroeconomic shocks can undermine confi-
dence in private and public debt repayment by slowing
down prospective growth of incomes and tax rev-
enues; and that default can occur and spread as loss of
confidence drives unsustainable default premia into
debt service ratios. It did not show that that develop-
ment of financial markets and supranational institu-
tions caused any of these age-old problems: rather, it
indicated how further evolution of those welcome
developments may make future crises less severe.
Beyond the crisis
Financial markets will need to be better regulated
internationally, within Europe as well globally. And
Europe will need to move further beyond its past
national configuration, because it would be poorly
equipped to compete with such multi-ethnic conti-
nent-sized entities as China and the United States if
social cohesion and political consensus still needed to
rely on recent and sometimes artificial feelings of
national solidarity. 
The European economic integration process was
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of previously belligerent nations. This is not easy, of
course, and fiscal and social policies have so far
remained assigned to national governments. Just like
renouncing monetary sovereignty was necessary to
ensure that European market would be stable and
large enough to allow the large-scale investment and
production of modern technologies, however, social
policy and income transfers will ultimately need to
transcend the boundaries of the nations that existed
in Europe over the last few centuries. The scope of
collective policies cannot be very different from that
of economic interactions made possible by the
progress of communication and transportation tech-
nologies. Every society needs a system of income
transfers and public debt service, while part of that
system in a closed economy, needs to rely on tax rev-
enues that in an open economy can quickly disappear
as economic activity moves elsewhere. 
It is for this reason that in the United States most
states are legally bound by balanced-budget rules,4
and the Federal government backed public debt since
the very beginning: as George Washington wrote in
1793 to the House of Representatives, “no pecuniary
consideration is more urgent than the regular redemp-
tion and discharge of the public debt: on none can delay
be more injurious, or an economy of the time more
valuable”.
In Europe, the Maastricht Treaty’s debt and deficit
constraints aimed at addressing much the same prob-
lem as state-level balanced budgets in the United
States but could not be enforced while national gov-
ernments retained all fiscal policy powers and all
political legitimacy. Unfettered economic integration,
however, is logically inconsistent with subsidiary fiscal
powers. If factors and goods can move freely across
the boundaries of fiscal constituencies, tax bases will
ultimately be too elastic to support income redistribu-
tion and issuance of public debt for tax-smoothing
purposes. 
Just as in the United States and other large Federal
countries, fiscal union will be the solution to the prob-
lems made evident by the current crisis. Not a perfect
solution, of course, and fraught with new pitfalls. But
certainly a better development than a return to closed
national economies unable to support economic
progress, and a feasible one if elements of fiscal and
social union will be accompanied by the development
of that common political culture which would sup-
port restraints on national government powers, and
complete the process which, in the aftermath of
World Wars, envisioned economic union as a means
to a cultural union end. 
Extraordinary changes are needed, and possible in the
aftermath of a crisis that brought about unprecedent-
ed coordination of macroeconomic policies not only
at the global level, averting the danger of a new Great
Depression; but also at the intergovernmental level in
Europe, averting the danger of sovereign insolvency
and financial meltdown. Recent institutional develop-
ments in Europe combine the relevant ingredients
(extended solidarity as regards public debt manage-
ment, and shared responsibility through policy moni-
toring and coordination as regards old-age and social
policies) with political concerns that still make it diffi-
cult for countries to help each other financially, and to
accept supranational coordination. The Franco-
German proposal to enforce by intergovernmental
methods a coordinated increase of retirement age and
harmonization of corporate tax bases in the euro area
was met with considerable skepticism in Spring 2011.
Only a rather loose ‘Euro Plus Pact’ was annexed to
the March 2011 European Council Conclusions,
whereby common objectives should be ‘politically
monitored’ by Heads of State or Government and the
European Commission should agree with EU mem-
ber countries the sustainability gap indicators for pen-
sions, health care, and social benefits. The regulatory
framework that would make it possible for private
financial markets reliably to fill citizens’ old-age pro-
tection needs is also hard to implement and enforce
supra-nationally.5
The future and the past
While the shortcomings of financial markets and of
economic union without political union have been
very apparent in the current crisis, socio-economic
institutions will certainly evolve further. It would not
be constructive to lament the demise of national sys-
tem or advocate a return to those or other obsolete
organizations. Rather, it may be useful to remember
that nation building processes went through much the
same difficult steps as Europe is called to climb. 
The boundaries of the German Empire and of other
national entities were established by wars, by ‘blood
4 See e.g. Bassetto and McGranahan (2011) for institutional infor-
mation, theoretical considerations, and empirical evidence.
5 The European Commission’s 2010 Green Paper on pensions
COM(2010)3765 notes that there are substantial gaps in EU-wide
regulatory aspects and advocates a EU role in ‘surveillance, coordi-
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and iron’ in the words of Bismarck, who quickly pro-
ceeded to cement national solidarity through provi-
sion of social protection. The process that is leading
to Europe’s further unification is peaceful instead,
indeed rooted in the desire to prevent further wars
among Europe’s peoples. Its steps, however, do resem-
ble closely those of the process that over some
50 years in the nineteenth century led Germany to
economic before political unification,6 and certainly
fostered doubts similar to those that many now
express about Europe’s integration process. Political
consensus can no longer be based on national identi-
ties when economic and social interactions take place
either at sub-national levels, or globally on the inter-
net. Abandoning the euro would make no more sense
than re-adoption in German regions of pre-Deutsche
Mark currencies, as might yet happen if Landesbank
losses caused by an unlikely (but still possible) col-
lapse of the single European currency proved difficult
to manage within Germany’s federal fiscal system. 
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PANEL
Panel Chair Robert Thomson, Managing Editor of
The Wall Street Journal and Editor-in-Chief of Dow
Jones, had an optimistic and a pessimistic view on
ageing. The optimistic view is that most of the people
attending this Summit will grow much older than at
any previous time in history; the pessimistic view is
that they will be unaffordable. Actuaries, he quipped,
have therefore become very fashionable. To put a fig-
ure to the pessimistic view, he quoted a couple of sta-
tistics: by 2035, two-thirds of every federal tax dollar
in the United States will go to state health care and
pensions. In New Zealand, the number of people over
the age of 85 has trebled over the past 30 years. The
challenge, then, is sizable – and growing.
The first panel speaker was Bavarian Economics
Minister Martin Zeil, who started by quoting Ludwig
Erhard, the father of the social market economy and
of Germany’s ‘economic miracle’: a good economic
policy is the best social policy. And that is exactly what
Mr Zeil believes every country needs in order “to put
[its] social system on a firm foundation for the
future”. The main task of an effective social policy, he
said, must be to strengthen the performance of the
economy in the face of global competition by sup-
porting innovation, education, efficient infrastructure,
transparent regulations and a sound energy policy.
But at the same time the state must continue to be the
guarantor of social security. People in need should
continue to be entitled to transfers through the basic
allowance scheme, which in Germany is “in principle
a sensible combination of due solidarity and the
incentives necessary to re-enter the labour market”. It
has contributed to an increase in employment by pro-
viding more incentives to take up a job and reducing
calls for a minimum wage. “We are building on more
personal responsibility and more self-reliance, for it is
definitely not the task of the state to guarantee all-
round insurance”. This has also brought Germany
one step further along the road to adapting the social
security systems to demographic change.
Mr Zeil was followed on the podium by Aigars Što-
kenbergs, a former Latvian Minister of Economics
who is now Minister for Justice. Given that the eco-
nomic and demographic situations differ, he said,
“there are no one-size-fits-all solutions”. For instance,
Latvia’s raise of the retirement age from the current
62 to 65 by 2021 may sound modest, but life expectan-
cy in his country is somewhat lower than elsewhere,
with 13 survival years for men and 20 for women. The
country has undertaken a number of other reforms of
its social security systems, including raising the num-
ber of years to qualify for a minimum pension and
reducing some contributions to the disabled and to
working parents. But not without hitting some snags:
some measures were overturned by the Constitutional
Court, forcing a repayment of the benefits that had
been slashed. But his country remains ambitious: it
wants to reduce its budget deficit to 2.5 percent of
GDP in 2012, with a view to fulfilling all conditions to
join the eurozone in January 2014. As regards the
future, from a social standpoint, he mentioned a min-
6 The pan-German Zollverein and Münzverein closely resembled the
process of market and monetary unification in post-war Europe. As
in Italy, monetary union occurred in Germany at the same time as
political unification; in older nations, such as France, political union
preceded the monetary reform process necessitated by the industrial
revolution in the 19th century.CESifo Forum 3/2011 37
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ister in the Norwegian government who had just
become a father and who is taking parental leave as a
result. That is the kind of future way Mr Štokenbergs
wants for his own country as well.
The last speaker was Kurt Biedenkopf, a former
Minister-President of Saxony. In the 1950s, he said,
with the country recovering from the war, Germany
defined the social function of the state as helping cit-
izens to help themselves. If they should be unable to
do so, they would be supported by the state for their
basic needs, but not beyond. In other words, the state
should not become a nanny to its citizenry. Now, fifty
years later, a wealthy population has come to expect
more expenditure by the government on social securi-
ty, but we are now in a situation “where it is necessary
for the people to relieve the state of some of the
promises it has made, by providing more for their own
future”. This requires a cultural change, but that can-
not be achieved by political fiat. Social systems, after
all, have deep cultural foundations. Furthermore, “we
have no experience with an ageing society. We have
never had one in history”. It is likely that people will
have to work for as long as they live, or as long as they
can, with ‘the 70-year-old taking care of the 90-year-
old’, while the working population finances the
younger retirees. We will need more personal solidari-
ty, more mutual support in the community. But given
that the elderly will command many votes, there is the
risk of the elderly pushing laws through that will
oblige the young to pay for what they decide they
need. A backlash would be likely. 
During the ensuing discussion, Mr Thomson asked
whether there should be a distinction in the retirement
age between people who do administrative work and
those who do heavy manual labour. Mr Bertola settled
for ‘60’. “Given that after 60, in some trades you cannot
do the same work you did before”, he stressed that what
is important is that the opportunity must be open for
those reaching that age to do something equally useful. 
Mr Štokenbergs argued that we should think about
‘integrating the elderly into work’. A simple calcula-
tion, he added, says that people spend 20 percent of
their lives in their formative years, 20 percent in retire-
ment, and 60 percent working. If they live longer, the
equation should also change: it now means we simply
have to work longer. Retraining would play a big role
in keeping people in occupation. 
Mr Biedenkopf pointed out that retirement age is a
fairly new concept. When it was introduced in
Germany in the late 19th century it was 70: “none of
the workers secured ever reached this age”. A better
way would be to set an age, say 65, after which the
government will cover your basic needs, and if you
continue working beyond that age, your retirement
payment increases, as if were capital-based. This
would eliminate the need for the government to pre-
scribe the retirement age. People would have an incen-
tive to decide themselves how long they wish to work.
“Retirement age will not be very stable in future”, he
predicts. 
Mr Bertola added that the approach must be two-
pronged. On the one hand, giving people who want to
continue working the chance to do so, and on the
other, take account of the differences in life expectan-
cy. As an aside, he also pointed out that retirement age
is handled as a nationwide issue, when in fact “mov-
ing east from central London, life expectancy decreas-
es by one year every Tube stop”. Mr Biedenkopf
immediately retorted that “this is one additional rea-
son why the government should not prescribe a par-
ticular retirement age”.
Mr Thomson then threw a provocative question to his
panellists: “do you think people in Portugal or Greece
retire too early or have too many holidays?” Mr
Bertola approached the answer from an angle: “the
feeling in Germany, as I understand it, is that if you
have to bail out a country for the unsustainable
promises it made to its own people, then the promises
must be changed”. Mr Štokenbergs, in turn, said that
the key issue is not how many holidays they have, “but
how well prepared people are to take on the chal-
lenges of the modern world”. 
Mr Biedenkopf concurred. Compared to the situation
of 50 years ago, he said, Germans have now 52 addi-
tional holidays just by not having to work on
Saturday. “This is perfectly alright. Holidays by them-
selves are not an expression of whether countries are
lazy or productive. If the productivity of a country is
such that it can produce what we all need in four days,
then the holidays would be three days per week”. We
would first have to look at the productivity of the
countries where these holidays are earned. If the
Portuguese want to have the number of holidays they
have, let them have them. “But they should not pass
on the cost of their holidays onto others”. 